Monoxide
2003-11-29 17:42:37 UTC
If, in the performance of a beneficial act, it will be necessary to
intentionally deceive the beneficiary of that act, is the act ethical or
not? When is it acceptable to say, "I lied to you so that I could do
something for your benefit?" If we accept that lying is morally wrong, then
it would seem that intentional deception by a moral person would require
that both of the following conditions be met:
A. Not deceiving the beneficiary (that is, telling the beneficiary the
truth) would result in harm to them, and,
B. Not doing the act would result in harm (that is, the act must be done or
someone will be harmed).
If these assumptions are correct, then President Bush's Thanksgiving Trip to
Iraq was unethical because, while it is true that it was necessary to
intentionally deceive us about the trip to prevent harm to himself and his
staff, the act of visiting the troops, while patriotic and supportive, was
not necessary to prevent harm to anyone. Therefore, when President Bush lied
to the American public on Thanksgiving Day, he satisfied A, but not B.
If visiting our troops on Thanksgiving Day would require the President to
intentionally deceive us, and the basis for making the trip did not involve
protecting someone from harm, then the act should not have been done. If we
truly believe that deception is morally wrong, then the only way we can ever
justify lying is if we must do so to protect something we value even more
greatly than fidelity, which, we must assume, is the value of human life.
While we value the service and patriotism of our soldiers and leaders, in
honoring them we cannot subordinate our respect for fidelity unless some
higher value takes precedence. For President Bush then, patriotism and
service to an ideal, take precedent over fidelity. If a person uses
deception in the service of any ideal other than the protection of human
life, then either that person is not moral, or lying is not morally wrong.
Charlie Morriss
Undergraduate Philosophy
University of Arizona
intentionally deceive the beneficiary of that act, is the act ethical or
not? When is it acceptable to say, "I lied to you so that I could do
something for your benefit?" If we accept that lying is morally wrong, then
it would seem that intentional deception by a moral person would require
that both of the following conditions be met:
A. Not deceiving the beneficiary (that is, telling the beneficiary the
truth) would result in harm to them, and,
B. Not doing the act would result in harm (that is, the act must be done or
someone will be harmed).
If these assumptions are correct, then President Bush's Thanksgiving Trip to
Iraq was unethical because, while it is true that it was necessary to
intentionally deceive us about the trip to prevent harm to himself and his
staff, the act of visiting the troops, while patriotic and supportive, was
not necessary to prevent harm to anyone. Therefore, when President Bush lied
to the American public on Thanksgiving Day, he satisfied A, but not B.
If visiting our troops on Thanksgiving Day would require the President to
intentionally deceive us, and the basis for making the trip did not involve
protecting someone from harm, then the act should not have been done. If we
truly believe that deception is morally wrong, then the only way we can ever
justify lying is if we must do so to protect something we value even more
greatly than fidelity, which, we must assume, is the value of human life.
While we value the service and patriotism of our soldiers and leaders, in
honoring them we cannot subordinate our respect for fidelity unless some
higher value takes precedence. For President Bush then, patriotism and
service to an ideal, take precedent over fidelity. If a person uses
deception in the service of any ideal other than the protection of human
life, then either that person is not moral, or lying is not morally wrong.
Charlie Morriss
Undergraduate Philosophy
University of Arizona